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RESUMEN: El presente artículo muestra un 
análisis comparativo del derecho de los Es-
tados Unidos de América y de la Unión Eu-
ropea enfocado en el principio de reconoci-
miento mutuo, el cual ha servido como base 
para lograr el reconocimiento y la aplicación 
de decisiones judiciales por parte de las au-
toridades de los distintos Estados miembros. 
Se ilustran los orígenes y la evolución de este 
principio en el ordenamiento jurídico de los 
Estados Unidos, así como su reciente imple-
mentación en el sistema de integración eu-
ropeo con miras a crear un espacio común 
de libertad, seguridad y justicia. Para ello se 
enumera y analiza un número importante de 
actos jurídicos adoptados hasta hoy en mate-
ria civil y penal. Igualmente se realza la in-
fluencia que ha tenido la jurisprudencia de la 
Corte Suprema de EU y del Tribunal de Justi-
cia de la UE en el desarrollo de este principio. 
Asimismo, se hace hincapié en la función que 
este principio ejerce como elemento unifica-
dor de una nación, planteándose la cuestión 
de la posible aplicación de este concepto a un 
sistema de integración regional de claros ma-
tices federales como la UE.
ABSTRACT: The paper shows a comparative analy-
sis of  the law of  the United States of  America (US) 
and the European Union (EU) focusing on the prin-
ciple of  mutual recognition, which has served as a 
basis in order to achieve the enforcement of  judicial 
decisions by the authorities of  the different Member 
States. It illustrates the origins and evolution of  this 
principle within the US legal system, as well as its 
recent implementation within the European integra-
tion system with the aim of  creating a common space 
of  freedom, security and justice. The paper lists and 
analizes a substancial number of  legal acts adopted 
so far in the area of  civil and criminal law. Fur-
thermore, it highlights the influence the case-law of  
the US Supreme Court and the Court of  Justice 
of  the EU has had on the development of  this 
principle. Moreover, it elaborates on the function of  
this principle as a nation-building element, raising 
the question whether this concept could be possibly 
transposed to a regional integration system with clear 
federal traits such as the EU.
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SUMMARY: I. Introduction. II. The Constitutional Concept of  Federalism. 
III. Mutual trust as a Precondition for Mutual Recognition. IV. Comparative Ap-
proach. V. Final Remarks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The present article aims at shedding light on the so-called “principle of  
mutual recognition”, known in the legal systems of  both the United States 
of  America (US) and the European Union (EU), however showing charac-
teristics of  its own depending on the area in which it respectively applies. 
For that purpose, the present article will elaborate on the constitutional 
concept of  federalism, in which the principle of  mutual recognition is often 
applied. Subsequently, it will examine the advantages of  this principle with 
regard to the mechanism of  approximation of  national/state legislation. A 
brief  analysis of  the principle of  mutual recognition of  judicial decisions in 
US law will serve as the starting point for a detailed narration of  the efforts 
done by the EU in order to implement this principle in its own legal system. 
This narration will be complemented by an overview of  some of  the main 
legal acts so far adopted. Particular emphasis will be given as well to the 
role the judiciary has played in the shaping of  this principle. An analysis 
of  the relevant case-law will prove relevant, as it shall be maintained that 
the doctrinal basis for this principle was to a large extend developed by the 
highest courts in the US and the EU.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPT OF FEDERALISM
“Federalism” in the sense used in the present article is meant to be 
construed as a political system based on the categories universally rec-
ognized in general theory of  state. Today federalism is a concept with 
multiple nuances. The US constitutes a classic model of  federation, itself  
being composed of  fifty self-governing States and several territories. The 
EU is an international organization1 established by twenty seven sovereign 
1  Klein, E., in Graf  Vitzthum, Wolfgang (ed.), Völkerrecht, Berlin-New York 1997, 
p. 246, classifies the EU as an international organization. He points out that the EU does 
not distinguish itself  much from other international organizations in terms of  the nature 
of  its constituency. However, the author admits that the EU represents a unique case in 
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States, some of  them formally organized along federalist principles (Aus-
tria, Belgium and Germany), while others have a longstanding tradition 
of  centralized governmental power (France). A third intermediate catego-
ry comprises those EU Member States currently immersed in a process of  
gradual evolution into more decentralized political systems (Spain, Italy 
and the United Kingdom),2 the reason being mainly an increasing de-
mand for autonomy by certain historical regions (Catalonia, South Tyrol 
and Scotland). 
Federalism is characterized by a division of  powers between member 
units and common institutions.3 Unlike in a unitary state, sovereignty in 
federal political orders is non-centralized, often constitutionally, between 
at least two levels so that units at each level have final authority and can be 
self  governing in some issue area. Citizens thus have political obligations 
to, or have their rights secured by, two authorities. Federally constituted 
states are characterized by their “multi-level legal system”, in which feder-
al law and the law of  the member units complement each other.4 The divi-
public international law in the sense that never before in the history of  international or-
ganizations a similar extensive conferral of  sovereign rights has taken place.
2  See on the process of  Devolution in the United Kingdom Leyland, P., “La devolu-
tion britannica: integrazione, responsabilità e controlli”, Unione europea e autonomie regionali 
– Prospettive per una Costituzione europea, Torino 2003, p. 91; Birkinshaw, P., “Devolution in 
the United Kingdom: Processes, problems and consequences for the UK constitution”, 
L’Europa tra federalismo e regionalismo, Milan 2003, p. 67.
3  Redish, M., The Constitution as Political Structure, New York-Oxford, 1995, p. 25, ex-
plains that decentralization of  political power makes perfect sense in a system premised 
on the fear of, and the desire to avoid, tyranny. Placing all sovereign authority in one 
governmental unit is an invitation to dictatorial rule. Federalism tends to avoid tyranny in 
two ways. First, by diving sovereign power between two levels of  government, a federal sys-
tem reduces the likelihood that the superior governmental level will be able to control all 
aspects of  its citizens’ lives. Second, if  the inferior governmental level attempts to impose 
tyrannical rule, its citizens have available the safety valve of  interstate mobility. Federalism 
is therefore, according to the author, a means to assure individual liberty.
4  German speaking authors often refer to “Mehrebenensysteme” when describing 
complex federal legal systems and the way how national and regional law is intertwined. 
This concept is being nowadays applied as well to the relation between supranational and 
national law, see Di Fabio, U., “Nationales Arbeitsrecht im Spannungsfeld von Grundg-
esetz und Grundrechtecharta”, Recht der Arbeit, 2012, p. 263; Schröder, M., Gesetzesbindung 
des Richters und Rechtsweggarantie im Mehrebenensystem, Tübingen 2010, p. 130; Ottvanger, T., 
“The (multilayered) public interest and the law of  the European Union”, Today’s multilayered 
legal order: Current issues and perspectives, Liber amicorum in honour of  Arjen W. H. Meij, Paris, 2011, 
www.juridicas.unam.mx
Esta revista forma parte del acervo de la Biblioteca Jurídica Virtual del Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la UNAM
http://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx
WERNER MIGUEL KÜHN BACA
D. R. © 2014. UNAM, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, 
Boletín Mexicano de Derecho Comparado, núm. 140, pp. 449-484.
452
sion of  power between the member unit and center may vary, typically the 
center has powers regarding defense and foreign policy, but member units 
may also have international roles. The decision-making bodies of  member 
units may also participate in central decision-making bodies. Much recent 
attention is spurred by renewed political interest in federalism, coupled 
with empirical findings concerning the requisite and legitimate basis for 
stability and trust among citizens in federal political orders. Federal ar-
rangements are seen as interesting solutions to accommodate differences 
among populations divided by ethnic or cultural cleavages yet seeking a 
common, often democratic, political order.5
As European integration moved forward during the past decades it 
became obvious to policymakers and scholars that the EU was gradu-
ally evolving into an entity showing an institutional structure similar to 
the ones existing in federal states around the globe.6 An recognition of  
this process was the landmark judgment of  12 October 1993, in which 
the German Constitutional Court referred to the EU as a “compound 
of  States” Staatenverbund,7 in an attempt to categorize it as a new type of  
political system, to be found somewhere between a “federation” a “con-
federation” and in which a delicate balance is struck between enhanced 
cooperation and State sovereignty.
Recent calls by high ranking political leaders as the president of  the 
European Commission José Manuel Barroso in his speech of  12 Septem-
ber 2012 at the European Parliament to embark on a new project giving 
rise to a “European Federation of  Nations” have given positive momen-
p. 243; Rösler, H., Europäische Gerichtsbarkeit auf  dem Gebiet des Zivilrechts, Tübingen, 2012, 
p. V.
5  Stein, E., Thoughts from a Bridge – A retrospective of  writings on New Europe and American 
federalism, 2003, p. 311, points out the fact that even while constructing a more centralized 
order to replace a disintegrating confederation, the drafters of  the American Constitution 
were worried about preserving regional diversity.
6  Rovná, L., “Constitutionalisation: The case of  the Convention as a Network Analy-
sis”, EU Constitutionalisation: From the Convention to the Constitutional Treaty 2002-2005 – anatomy, 
analysis, assessment, p. 20, describes the EU as “more than a classical international organi-
zation and less than a full-fledged federal state, which derives its legitimacy from both its 
member states and their citizens”.
7  Judgment of  12 October 1993 regarding the compatibility of  the Treaty of  Maas-
tricht with the German Basic Law the German Constitutional Court referred to the EU as 
a “compound of  States” (Staatenverbund).
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tum to this development. Suited with supranational bodies sharing leg-
islative powers with the Member States, the EU as an entity of  its own 
and endowed with international legal personality had been conferred the 
competence to adopt binding legal acts in certain delegated policy areas, 
which were to be applicable in the territory of  all the Member States. Fol-
lowing a development analogical to the evolution of  some federal states, 
the EU founding treaties became —not least due to the concept of  pri-
macy of  EU law over national law developed by the European of  Justice 
(ECJ)—8 the paramount law of  the Member States, setting the constitu-
tional framework of  a future political union. This development implied 
for the Member States a duty to make their national provisions, including 
those ranking as constitutional law, conform to EU law. At the top of  the 
institutional system the ECJ was placed, entrusted with the task of  
ensuring the uniform and correct application of  EU law by the national 
authorities. This implied for the ECJ the attribution of  the competence to 
settle disputes between the EU bodies and the Member States and even 
to sanction Members States in breach of  their obligations resulting from 
EU law. In the area of  external relations the EU soon replaced the Mem-
ber States by assuming essential functions which were reserved to them in 
the past, as the creation of  a customs union and, by doing so, adopting a 
common trade policy. In addition, institutional arrangements were made 
in order to enable the governments of  the Member States to speak for the 
first time with one voice. The attribution of  international legal personality 
—initially implicitly and ultimately by adding an express provision in Arti-
cle 47 of  the EU-Treaty in the context of  the amendments introduced by 
the Lisbon Treaty—9 has enabled the EU to conclude various agreements 
8  Judgments of  the ECJ of  15 July 1964, case 6/64, Costa/ENEL [1964] ECR 585; 
of  9 March 1978, case 106/77, Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629; of  8 September 2010, case 
C-409/06, Winner Wetten [2010] ECR I-8015.
9  Before the entering into force of  the Lisbon Treaty the question relating to the 
international legal personality of  the EU was a matter of  discussion among scholars. 
Schoutheete, P. de and Andoura, S., “The Legal Personality of  the European Union”, 
Working Paper – European Affairs Program, Royal Institute for International Relations. Most of  them 
agreed however that the EU had implicitly acquired legal personality, as it fulfilled the 
conditions set by international law, in particular the International Court of  Justice (see 
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of  the United Nations, International Court 
of  Justice, Advisory Opinion of  11 April 1949, ICJ Reports [1949]), for the recognition of  
this status. The EU had been conferred functions it could only exert if  it had been granted 
www.juridicas.unam.mx
Esta revista forma parte del acervo de la Biblioteca Jurídica Virtual del Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la UNAM
http://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx
WERNER MIGUEL KÜHN BACA
D. R. © 2014. UNAM, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, 
Boletín Mexicano de Derecho Comparado, núm. 140, pp. 449-484.
454
with States and regional integration schemes. European integration has 
thus led to a significant shift of  power in favour of  supranational bodies 
and to an increased cohesion among the Member States. The successive 
revision of  the treaties over the past years gave rise to a process scholars 
commonly characterize as “constitutionalisation” of  the EU, in the sense 
that on the one hand it has helped consolidate its institutional structure 
and legal order; on the other hand it has defined the set of  values which 
are at the core of  the integration process. This process culminated in the 
enactment of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the EU with enter-
ing into force of  the Lisbon Treaty, which made the Charter legally binding 
on both the EU bodies and Member States when implementing EU law. 
The Charter has nowadays become the cornerstone of  the EU legal sys-
tem and a symbol of  identification among EU citizens.
The fact that the EU had originally been founded as an international 
organization of  public international law10 and for that reason lacked the 
essential characteristics of  statehood was no obstacle that would prevent 
Europeans from adopting solutions previously developed in federal states 
in an attempt to ensure the consistent application of  EU law while at the 
same time respecting the remaining sovereignty of  the Member States. 
Inevitably, the focus of  interest turned towards US federal constitutional-
ism and its longstanding tradition, which ultimately became a source of  
inspiration for those policymakers and scholars involved in the process 
of  designing the future of  Europe. The comparative approach pursued 
made sense, given the fact that the US had faced similar challenges as the 
EU in their early days of  constituency. Alike the EU, the US’ major inter-
est consisted from the very beginning in creating an integrated economic 
area by eliminating regulatory barriers likely to obstruct the free trade be-
tween the several States. The achievement of  this goal constituted a mile-
stone in US history as was in the framework of  the European integration 
legal personality. Practice translated into two specific characteristics: the capacity to con-
tract agreements with other international actors (treaty-making power) and the capacity to 
entertain bilateral diplomatic relations with those international actors (active and passive 
right of  legation).
10  In its judgment of  5 February 1963 in the case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos [1963] 
ECR, p. 1, the ECJ indicated that the European Economic Community (EEC) constituted 
“a new legal order of  international law”.
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process.11 However the approach followed on both sides of  the Atlantic 
was slightly different. 
1. The Power of  US Congress to regulate Commerce
The approach pursued in US law resided basically in the idea that 
competence to regulate interstate commerce rested exclusively on Con-
gress as the federal legislative body. The US Constitution conferred this 
competence to Congress by virtue of  Article I, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce 
Clause) and it has exercised this power ever since. The challenge to in-
consistent State action rests on both the exercise of  this legislative power 
and the pre-emptive effect of  the federal legislation under the Supremacy 
Clause of  Article VI, § 2 of  the US Constitution. The Commerce Clause 
has been interpreted by the US Supreme Court as excluding any State 
competence on a determined the matter from the moment on Congress 
has made use of  its legislative power. In other words, conflicts between 
domestic State law and the law adopted by Congress have usually been 
resolved by invoking the primacy of  federal law over state law. 
In the absence of  congressional pre-emption the US Supreme Court 
invalidates “protectionist” state legislation by invoking the so-called “Dor-
mant Commerce Clause”.12 The US Constitution nowhere explicitly gives 
the Supreme Court this task. Article I, § 10 bars States from imposing 
duties on imports or exports in foreign commerce without the consent of  
Congress. And the Privileges and Immunities Clause of  Article IV bars 
State discrimination against out-of-state citizens. But the text of  the Con-
stitution nowhere expressly divests the States of  the power to regulate in-
terstate commerce. For such limitations, the US Supreme Court has drawn 
on the negative implications of  the grant of  power to Congress to regulate 
interstate commerce. Article I, § 8, cl. 3 provides, “The Congress shall 
have power [to] regulate Commerce [among] the several States”. Into 
that affirmative grant the Court has read judicially enforceable limits on 
state legislation when Congress has not acted. To justify these implications 
11  Steiner, J. and Woods, L., EU Law, 10th ed., Oxford 2009, p. 360.
12  Farrar, T., Manual of  the Constitution of  the United States of  America, Boston, 1867, p. 
330, explains the reason behind the rule giving Congress the sole power to regulate com-
merce, excluding State competence.
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from the Commerce Clause, the Court has relied largely on history and on 
inferences from the federal structure envisaged in the US constitution.13
The importance of  this case-law becomes even more obvious if  it is 
taken into account that the US Supreme Court has for the most part in-
terpreted the powers of  Congress to regulate interstate commerce exten-
sively, as the landmark judgment in the Gibbons v. Ogden14 case shows.15 
In subsequent judgments the US Supreme Court went so far as to say that 
even activity entirely within one state could be regulated by the federal 
government if  the activity had an effect on interstate commerce.16 Com-
mentators suggest that the intention behind this broad interpretation of  
the Commerce Clause was to strengthen the powers of  the federal legis-
lator, ultimately fostering national unity.17 As Justice Cardozo explained 
in the judgment Baldwin v. G.A.F. Selig. Inc.,18 “The Constitution …was 
framed upon the theory that the peoples of  the several states must sink or 
swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in un-
ion and not division”. For this reason, any State law aiming at protecting 
internal economic interests of  a State to the detriment of  the economic 
interests of  other States is believed to run counter to the intention of  the 
Founding Fathers to eradicate the risks of  an economic war between 
the States.19
2. Fundamental freedoms and harmonisation in the EU
The EU, on the other hand, has over the past decades pursued its 
goal of  creating its internal market to a large extend by enforcing the so-
called fundamental freedoms (free movement of  persons, services, estab-
lishment and capital) against national rules interfering with this objective. 
By conferring primacy to the Treaty provisions granting these freedoms 
13  Sullivan, K. and Gunther, G., Constitutional Law, 17th ed., New York, 2010, p. 124.
14  Gibbons V. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
15  Stone, G. et al., Constitutional Law, 3rd ed., Boston, 1996, p. 189; Nowak, J. and Ro-
tunda, R., Constitutional Law, St. Paul, 2000, p. 176.
16  See National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1 (1937) 
and United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
17  Zoller, E., Les grands arrêts de la Cour suprême des États-Unis, Paris, 2010, p. 91, 93. 
18  Baldwin v. G.A.F. Selig. Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
19  Zoller, E., Les grands arrêts…, cit., p. 93.
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over national legislation, the EU was able to gradually dismantle the most 
discernible barriers in trade. National legislation putting up obstacles to 
free trade was considered not in compliance with EU law. However, this 
dismantling approach could hardly be considered sufficient. Legislative 
measures had to be adopted in order to create uniform conditions of  trade 
throughout the internal market. Besides, the process of  creating the inter-
nal market had to be take place in an uniform, progressive and gradual 
manner in order to reduce as much as possible the potential threat of  a 
“downward spiral” in standards arising from producers and service pro-
viders seeking to move their base to the Member State with the lowest 
regulatory burden.20
Approximation of  national legislation via Directives, commonly 
known by the French term “harmonisation”, was the solution to this chal-
lenge. Directives as legal instruments only known in the EU legal system 
are characterized by the fact that they contain a legislative program which 
requires transposition by all Member States. By virtue of  Article 288, Par-
agraph 3 TFEU,21 Directives are binding, as to the result to be achieved, 
upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but leaves to the na-
tional authorities the choice of  form and methods. Directives manage to 
strike the delicate balance between the need to approximate national laws 
while taking into account differences in traditions as well as the specifici-
ties of  national legislation. This constitutes an advantage, particularly in 
federal structures, in which different legal systems coexist, parallel to each 
other. In addition to this, Article 288, Paragraph 2 TFEU provides for the 
possibility to adopt Regulations. A Regulation has general application, is 
binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Where 
a Regulation is adopted as a legislative act, it generally confers executive 
tasks on national authorities (or EU bodies). Their main advantage com-
pared to Directives is that they automatically form part of  the highest 
provisions of  a Member State’s legal order without it being necessary to 
transpose it in any way.22 This ensures the unification of  law and its uni-
form application in all Member States.
20  Steiner, J. and Woods, EU Law, cit., p. 360.
21  The acronym “TFEU” stands for “Treaty on the Functioning of  the European 
Union”. 
22  Lenaerts, K. and Van Nuffel, P., European Union Law, 3rd ed., London, 2011, p. 893.
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The harmonizing effect of  ECJ case-law should not remain unmen-
tioned in the context of  market integration. Approximation of  national 
legislation is pointless if  the harmonised law is not applied in the same 
manner by all courts EU-wide. Only if  this happens will the final goal of  
legal certainty and of  uniformity be achieved.23 Identical interpretation 
of  harmonised law by all courts however does not occur automatically. 
Even within national jurisdictions, the interpretation of  legal rules var-
ies greatly, in particular, amongst the lower instance courts. In an EU of  
twenty seven or more grown legal systems, the differences may be even 
stronger. Especially in the field of  private law, national courts seeking for 
continuity may be rather inclined to follow their legal traditions and adapt 
EU legislation to their national legal systems other than the other way 
around. The ECJ has managed to counter this trend by resorting to a 
series of  principles born out of  the rationale of  integration. These are, 
among others, the principles of  autonomous interpretation of  EU law24 
and of  interpretation in light of  the relevant Directive.25 By means of  the 
preliminary judgment procedure in Article 267 TFEU, the ECJ has an-
swered questions referred by national courts on matters of  interpretation. 
It is then for the national court to apply EU law as interpreted by the ECJ 
to the instant case. Even though according to established ECJ case-law, 
it is not the responsibility of  the ECJ to decide national cases but only to 
interpret EU law,26 the impact of  this mechanism on the process of  har-
monisation has been remarkable.
23  Rott, P., “What is the Role of  the ECJ in EC Private Law? – A Comment on the ECJ 
judgments in Océano Grupo, Freiburger Kommunalbauten, Leitner and Veedfald”, Hanse 
Law Review, 2005, núm. 1, vol. 1, p. 6.
24  In essence, the principle of  autonomous interpretation means that there is only one 
correct interpretation of  a tem used in EU legislation, and that this one correct meaning 
must be found independently from national or other interpretations of  the same term. 
Exceptions are only made where a Directive explicitly refers to national law.
25  Under the principle of  interpretation of  national law in the light of  the relevant 
Directive, national courts are required to interpret their national law in the light of  the 
wording and the purpose of  the relevant Directives in order to achieve the result referred 
to in Article 288 Paragraph 3 TFEU.
26  In its judgment of  12 June 1980 in the case 1/80, Salmon, the ECJ declared that in 
connexion with the task entrusted to it by [Article 267] the Court has no jurisdiction to re-
view the application of  the provisions of  [EU law] to a given case or to criticize the way in 
which a national court applies [EU law]”. Lenaerts, K. and Arts, D./Maselis, I., Procedural 
Law of  the European, 2nd ed., London, 2006, 6-026, p. 192, explain that it falls in any event to 
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The nature of  harmonisation itself  is quite varied. The form of  har-
monisation by which a common standard is introduced is sometimes re-
ferred to as ‘positive’ harmonisation, because new standards are intro-
duced. The removal of  existing barriers by striking down of  national laws 
is known as ‘negative’ harmonisation. Moreover, regarding the degree of  
harmonisation, it is possible to distinguish between total and minimum har-
monisation. The first option leaves the Member States with no scope for 
further independent action in the field covered by the harmonising meas-
ure. In other words, Member States’ competence to act has been pre-
empted by EU action. As far as the area covered by a total harmonisation 
Directive is concerned, Member States must ensure that their domestic 
legal system provides exactly what is required by that Directive, with the 
consequence that it is not possible to introduce a stricter standard. In a 
minimum harmonisation, the EU will set down a minimum standard with 
which all the Member States must comply. Beyond this minimum level, 
Member States are free to set their standards, subject to the requirements 
of  the EU-Treaties.27
III. MUTUAL TRUST AS A PRECONDITION 
FOR MUTUAL RECOGNITION
Where harmonisation of  legislation finds its limits in the lack of  politi-
cal will on the part of  the States —often due to sovereignty concerns or 
constitutional constraints— despite the need to strengthen the integration 
in a single economic space, federal structures may be more inclined to 
apply the principle of  mutual recognition in order to overcome obstacles 
created by the diversity of  legislation. Depending on the degree of  inter-
est a single Member State has in integration, one or more advantages of  
this approach are likely to be emphasized: The idea that one can pursue 
the national court to dispose of  the case. In that sense, the judgment giving a ruling on in-
terpretation, no matter to what extend it determines the outcome of  the main proceedings, 
is always “preliminary”, that is to say, given before the national court gives final judgment 
in the main proceedings. However, the ECJ does not shrink from giving guidance base on 
the case-file and the written and oral observations which have been submitted to it, with a 
view of  enabling the national court to give judgment on the application of  EU law in the 
specific case with which it is having to deal.
27  Chalmers, D. et al., European Union Law, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2010, p. 700.
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market integration while respecting “diversity” amongst the participating 
States, is bound to be attractive to many. In fact, for those opposing har-
monisation, mutual recognition may appear useful as it can provide results 
for judicial authorities when cooperating across borders, while prima facie 
Members States do not to have to change their domestic law to implement 
EU standards. For others, the advantage of  the notion will be found in the 
combination of  far-reaching economic integration and relatively limited 
centralisation. After all, under pure mutual recognition, Member States 
recognize (“horizontally”) one another’s regulatory regimes and forego 
centralized regulation. Furthermore, mutual recognition may be regarded 
by some as a necessary condition for “regulatory competition”28 between 
the Member States, which, in turn, may prevent them from succumbing 
to interest groups advocating costly regulation not justified by market fail-
ures. As we can see, the advantages of  the mechanism of  mutual recogni-
tion are numerous and cannot be overemphasized.
However, mutual recognition comes at a high price, as it presupposes 
admitting the equal status of  other States, as well as the outspoken trust in 
the correctness and legitimacy of  their internal decision-making process-
es. The central element of  the mechanism of  mutual recognition is that an 
individual national standard, judgment or order —and not a negotiated 
general standard— must be recognized by other Member States. In recog-
nizing these standards in specific cases, national authorities implicitly ac-
cept as legitimate the national regulatory/legal/justice system which has 
produced them in the first place. In that sense, mutual recognition repre-
sents a journey into the unknown, as some commentators have rightly noted,29 
where national authorities are in principle obliged to recognize standards 
28  “Regulatory competition” can be defined as a process whereby legal rules are se-
lected and de-selected through competition between decentralised, rule-making enti-
ties, which could be nation states, or other political units, such as regions or localities. A 
number of  beneficial effects are expected to flow from this process. Insofar as it avoids 
the imposition of  rules by a centralised, “monopoly” regulator, it promotes diversity and 
experimentation in the search of  effective laws. In addition, by providing mechanisms for 
the preferences of  the different users of  laws to be expressed and for alternative solutions 
to common problems to be compared, it enhances the flow of  information on what works 
in practice. Deakin, S., “Legal Diversity and Regulatory Competition: Which Model for 
Europe?”, European Law Journal, núm. 12, 2006, p. 441.
29  Mitsilegas, V., “The constitutional implications of  mutual recognition in criminal 
matters in the EU”, Common Market Law Review, 2006, p. 1282.
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emanating from the national system of  any Member State on the basis of  
mutual trust, with a minimum of  formality. 
Although accepting and applying foreign law has always been a cen-
tral element in private international law, this journey into the unknown in 
mutual recognition is different and raises a number of  concerns in other 
areas, particularly in the sensitive field of  criminal law, where a high level 
of  legal certainty is required and the relationship between the individual 
and the State is at stake. The adoption of  criminal law and the sanctioning 
faculty of  a State (ius puniendi) being still considered matters which remain 
at the core of  national sovereignty, quite a few States may be reluctant to 
accept decisions taken by foreign judicial authorities which may even af-
fect their own nationals. An evidence of  this is the refusal of  several coun-
tries around the globe, like France30 and Japan,31 to extradite their own 
nationals facing prosecution abroad, notwithstanding the nature of  the 
criminal charges brought against them. Some of  them have elevated 
the prohibition to extradite own nationals even to constitutional status, 
as is the case of  Switzerland,32 Germany33 and Russia.34 These countries 
often have laws in place that give them jurisdiction over crimes committed 
abroad by or against citizens. 
The difficulties the principle of  mutual recognition faces become ob-
vious in extreme cases in which the legal systems involved appear irrec-
oncilable because they reflect different sets of  moral values. An example 
of  this difficulty would be the duty to recognize a judicial order aiming at 
enforcing in another State a right conferred in the legislation of  the issu-
ing State to same-sex marriages although this kind of  personal union is 
unknown in the other State’s legal system.35 Another example of  a per-
30  Article 696-4, Paragraph 1 of  the French Code of  Criminal Procedure.
31  Article 2, Paragraph 9 of  the Japanese Law of  Extradition.
32  Article 25, Paragraph 1 of  the Swiss Federal Constitution.
33  Article 16, Paragraph 2 of  the German Basic Law.
34  Article 61, Paragraph 1 of  the Russian Constitution.
35  This issue has raised questions in the US on the scope of  the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause. Traditionally, every state honoured a marriage legally contracted in any other 
state. However, in 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that Hawaii’s statute restricting 
legal marriage to parties of  the opposite sex establishes a sex-based classification, which 
is subject to strict scrutiny if  challenged on Equal Protection grounds (Baehr V. Lewin, 
852 P.2d 44, 74 Haw. 530). Although the Supreme Court did not recognize a constitu-
tional right to same-sex marriage, it raised the possibility that a successful equal protection 
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ceptible incompatibility of  legislations would be an arrest warrant issued 
by one State against the citizen of  another State on grounds of  an alleged 
offence not expressly penalized in the State of  residence of  the individual 
concerned.36 Lastly, human right concerns can in some cases lead to an 
absolute denial of  international judicial cooperation, as shows the refusal 
by Member States of  the Council of  Europe37 and the EU38 to grant ex-
tradition if  the person concerned faces the death penalty in the request-
ing State. Legal practice in the US and the EU show that those and simi-
lar cases can happen anytime. That explains why most legal instruments 
implementing mutual recognition do still provide for safeguard clauses 
challenge to the state’s marriage laws could eventually lead to state-sanctioned same-sex 
marriages. In response to the Baehr case, Congress in 1996 passed the Defense of  Mar-
riage Act (110 Stat. § 2419), which defines marriage as a union of  a man and a woman 
for federal purposes and expressly grants states the right to refuse to recognize a same-sex 
marriage performed in another state. Some commentators have drawn a parallel with the 
mutual recognition of  interracial marriage, banned in some States until 1967, when 
the US Supreme Court struck down all statutory bans in its judgment Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1 (1967). However, it is important to bear in mind that in the Loving judgment 
the US Supreme Court did not base its reasoning on the aforementioned clause but on the 
fundamental right to marry and the Due Process Clause enshrined in the 14th Amend-
ment. Although the case involved a Virginia couple prosecuted for violating that state’s 
ban on interracial marriage by visiting the District of  Columbia, which allowed such mar-
riages, the Supreme Court did not suggest that Virginia was obliged to recognize the mar-
riage by virtue of  the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
36  See the series of  possible cases the German Constitutional Court referred to in the 
hearing held 13 and 14 February 2005 in the case on the constitutionality of  the European 
Arrest Warrant (2 BvR 2236/04), reproduced by Schorkopf, F., Der Europäische Haftbefehl vor 
dem Bundesverfassungsgericht, Tübingen 2006, p. 218.
37  Article 11 of  the European Convention on Extradition, signed in Paris on 13 De-
cember 1957, stipulates that extradition may be refused if  the offence for which extradi-
tion is requested is punishable by death under the law of  the requesting country.
38  Article 13 of  the Agreement on extradition between the European Union and the 
United States of  America (OJEU L 181/27), signed on 25 June 2003 and in force since 1 
February 2010, stipulates that where the offence for which extradition is sought is punish-
able by death under the laws in the requesting State and not punishable by death under the 
laws in the requested State, the requested State may grant extradition on the condition that 
the death penalty shall not be imposed on the person sought, or if  for procedural reasons 
such condition cannot be complied with by the requesting State, on condition that the 
death penalty if  imposed shall not be carried out. If  the requesting State accepts extradi-
tion subject to conditions pursuant to this Article, it shall comply with the conditions. If  the 
requesting State does not accept the conditions, the request for extradition may be denied.
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conferring national authorities the power to deviate from this principle in 
exceptional cases.
Mutual trust can however be promoted through harmonisation, for 
instance of  procedural guarantees. Harmonisation of  procedural safe-
guards taking due account of  individual rights can convince the authori-
ties of  the requested State of  the “equivalence” of  legal protection39 or, 
at least, of  a common interest in pursuing similar objectives. Both ap-
proaches —mutual recognition and harmonisation— do not preclude 
each other but can be used in a complementary manner. Harmonisation 
can be pressed forward to a degree which seems acceptable to all States 
concerned. Minimal harmonisation of  standards can be a first step. The 
US and EU have used both approaches in a number of  areas including 
civil, criminal and administrative matters. Before elaborating in the man-
ner how the principle of  mutual recognition has been applied on some of  
areas of  EU law it seems convenient to explain the meaning of  the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause enshrined in Article IV, section 1 of  the US Con-
stitution in its interpretation given by the US Supreme Court. Explaining 
its functioning will help understand the reason why the EU has been eager 
to emulate it in its own legal order.
IV. COMPARATIVE APPROACH
1. The “Full Faith and Credit” clause in the US Constitution
The Full Faith and Credit Clause provides that “Full Faith and Credit 
shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records and judicial Pro-
ceedings of  every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws 
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall 
be proved, and the Effect thereof ”. The first sentence of  the clause closely 
tracked language contained in Article IV of  the Articles of  Confedera-
tion, the precursor of  the present US federal constitution. The second 
sentence, which authorizes Congress to enact implementing legislation, 
39  Morgan, C., “Where are we now with EU procedural rights?”, European Human 
Rights Law Review, núm. 4, 2012, p. 428. explains that mutual recognition can not function 
optimally without a high level of  trust and that such trust can only be achieved if  common 
standards in the area of  procedural right are in place.
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was new. “Faith and credit” was a familiar term in English law where it 
had been used on occasion for some centuries to describe the respect owed 
to judgments and other public records. Its precise meaning, however, was 
obscure; it was not clear whether it was concerned only with the admis-
sion of  public records, including judgments, into evidence or whether it 
was intended to deal likewise with the effect as res judicata to which a judg-
ment was entitled. There is similar uncertainty with respect to the mean-
ing which the term was intended to bear in the Articles of  Confederation.
The subject of  full faith and credit evoked little discussion in the US 
Constitutional Convention, and it seems unlikely that there was any gen-
eral understanding among the delegates of  what the clause was designed 
to accomplish. In any event, Congress was quick to exercise its power to 
pass implementing legislation. This is the case of  the Full Faith and Credit 
Statute, 28 USCS § 1738. The initial statute was enacted in 1790 by the 
First Congress. It provided for the manner of  authenticating the acts of  
the legislatures and of  the records and judicial proceedings of  the several 
states and concluded that “the said records and judicial proceedings shall 
have such faith and credit given to them in every court of  the United 
States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of  the State from whence 
the said records are or shall be taken.” The second congressional act, that 
of  1804, extended the scope of  full faith and credit by requiring that the 
same measure of  respect should be given to the records and judicial pro-
ceedings of  the territories of  the US and of  the countries subject to its 
jurisdiction.
Judicial decisions have made clear many aspects that the full faith and 
credit clause and its implementing statutes left uncertain. The Supreme 
Court has decided that, provided the requirements of  jurisdiction, notice, 
and opportunity to be heard have been satisfied, a judgment rendered in 
one state, territory, or possession of  the US shall in general be given the 
same res judicata effect that it has in the state of  its rendition. Exception to 
this rule, if  any there be, are few indeed. A state cannot, for example, deny 
effect to a judgment on the ground that the underlying claim was contrary 
to its public policy. Initially, some might have wondered whether Congress 
was empowered to extend the protection of  full faith and credit to the 
records and judicial proceedings of  territories and possession of  the US. 
The full faith and credit clause itself  gives no such authority, but the Su-
preme Court has held that this is to be found in those provisions of  the US 
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Constitution that afford the US with judicial power (Article III), authorize 
legislation that is necessary and proper to execute the powers entrusted to 
the federal government (Article II, section 8), and provide that the Consti-
tution and the laws and treaties of  the US shall be the supreme law of  the 
land (Article VI). Neither the clause nor the implementing statute refer to 
judgments of  the federal courts. The Supreme Court has filled this gap by 
holding that these judgments are entitled to the same respect that is owed 
to state judgments.
The character of  this clause as a symbol of  national unity was been 
repeatedly pointed out by the Supreme Court in its case-law. In the judg-
ment of  1839 in the McElmoyle v. Cohen case40 the Supreme Court ruled 
that the following was to be deduced from that clause:
[T]he judgment of  a state Court carries with it into every state all its ori-
ginal attributes, energies, and incidents; that it goes forth armed with the 
powers of  the Court that pronounced it, and clothed with the authority of  
the laws under which it was pronounced; that it is at home withersoever it 
goes, through the whole length and breadth of  the Union; that, in relation to 
judicial proceedings, the states are not foreign to each other.
A clear distinction must be drawn between the recognition and the en-
forcement of  judgments. With respect to recognition, the Supreme Court 
has held, as has already been said, that a judgment must be given the same 
res judicata effect that it enjoys under the law of  the state of  its rendition. 
On the other hand, the method of  enforcing a judgment is determined 
by the law of  the state of  its rendition. On the other hand, the method 
of  enforcing a judgment is determined by the law of  the state where en-
forcement is sought. It is therefore for this latter law to determine whether 
a new action in the nature of  debt must be brought on the judgment or 
whether it can be enforced by means of  a registration procedure.
Full faith and credit is not owed to the judgments of  foreign countries. 
Each state of  the US determines for itself  the measure of  respect that 
such judgments are to receive in its courts. US Courts are believed to be 
particularly liberal in giving respect to the judgments of  other countries, 
mainly because of  their experience in giving full faith and credit to federal 
and sister State judgments. The intentions of  the original framers of  the 
40  McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. 312 (1839).
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clause may have been obscure. But the Supreme Court has said that full 
faith and credit clause should become a nationally unifying force by establish-
ing “throughout the federal system the salutary principle of  the Common 
Law that litigation once pursued to judgment shall be as conclusive of  the 
rights of  the parties in every other court as in that where the judgment was 
rendered”. As the Supreme Court has declared in its judgment of  1935 
Milwaukee Country v. M. E. White41
the very purpose of  the purpose of  the full faith and credit clause was to 
alter the status of  the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, 
each free to ignore obligations created under the laws or by the judicial pro-
ceedings of  the others, and to make them integral parts of  a single national 
throughout which a remedy upon a just obligation might be demanded as of  
right, irrespective of  the state of  its origin.
The characteristic of  the clause as a cornerstone in the process of  
forging national unity became particularly clear in the McElmoyle judg-
ment rendered in 1839, in which the Supreme Court analyzed the clause 
in the light of  the reason and spirit of  it:
The framers of  that instrument foresaw that there would be a perpetual 
change and interchange of  citizens between the several states. They had con-
federated a number of  bodies politic; they had secured to each a similar form 
of  government; they had placed over all, in some respects, a controlling, 
and, in all respects, a protecting power. They had therefore sundered some 
of  the strongest ties that bind man to his native land, and left him free to 
choose a climate congenial of  this constitution, and an occupation suited to 
his taste of  habits, without forfeiting the protection of  his own laws. To have 
incorporated no provision in the Constitution which would prevent men, 
thus circumstances, from eluding the operation of  a judgment, by a simple 
change of  residence, would have argued a blindness in the sages who framed 
that instruments, that might be better imputed to any other body of  men that 
ever lived.
It will have been noted that whereas the full faith and credit clause 
speaks of  “public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings,” the implementing stat-
utes of  1790 and 1804 required only that full faith and credit be given to 
41  Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
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records and judicial proceedings. No definite information is available on 
why public acts were omitted, but it can be surmised that this omission 
was deliberate and stemmed from the realization that the circumstances, 
if  any, in which one state should be required to apply another’s law pre-
sented considerations infinitely more complex than those involving the 
recognition and enforcement of  judgments. After some years the Supreme 
Court held that the clause was self-executing and that there were limited 
circumstances in which a state was required to apply another’s laws. By 
and large, the Supreme Court has now withdrawn from its earlier opin-
ions and today command of  full faith and credit with respect to public acts 
is slight indeed. The Supreme Court has, however, held that full faith and 
credit imposes limitations upon the power of  a state to refuse on public 
policy grounds to entertain suit on a claim arising under the law of  a sister 
state. 
The implementing statute remained substantially unchanged from 
1804 to 1948. In the latter year, it was amended as part of  a general revi-
sion of  Title 28 of  the United States Code. This revision was not intended 
to make controversial substantive changes in the law. Nevertheless, the 
implementing statute was amended to require that full faith and credit be 
given not only to records and judicial proceedings, as had been the case 
heretofore, but to acts as well. In the recent past the clause has been ap-
plied to new matters. Child custody determinations had historically fallen 
under the jurisdiction of  state courts and before the 1970’s other states did 
not accord them full faith and credit enforcement. As a result, a divorced 
parent who was unhappy with one state’s custody decision could some-
times obtain a more favourable ruling from another state. This was an in-
centive for a dissatisfied parent to kidnap a child and move to another state 
in order to petition for custody. In response to this situation, legislation has 
been adopted during the 1980s and 1990s on both federal and state level 
so as to ensure enforcement of  child custody decisions by providing that 
valid custody decrees are entitled to full faith and credit enforcement in 
other states. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) was adopted 
by the National Conference of  Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(NCCUSL) in 1968.42 This approach aimed at an approximation of  state 
42  The NCCUSL is a non-profit, unincorporated association commonly consisting of  
commissioners appointed by each state, the District of  Columbia, the Commonwealth 
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laws. By 1984, every state had adopted a version of  the UCCJA, although 
a number of  adoptions significantly departed from the original text. In 
1980, the federal government enacted the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act 
(PKPA)43 to address the interstate custody jurisdictional problems that con-
tinued to exist after the adoption of  the UCCJA. In 1997 the NCCUSL 
adopted the Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) in order 
to eliminate inconsistent state interpretations.44
2. The principle of  mutual recognition in EU law
A. European internal market
Mutual recognition is a principle familiar in different areas of  EU 
law. Its origins date back to the time when the European internal market 
was in the process of  being put in place with the fundamental freedoms 
ensuring its functioning. The early concept of  mutual recognition, which 
derives from the case-law of  the ECJ, was one of  the means of  ensuring 
the free movement of  goods within the internal market. It was introduced 
by the ECJ after attempts to establish free trade through harmonisation 
(commonly known as the “Old Approach”) had failed, being a demand-
ing unanimity requirement within the Council, as well as the insufficien-
cy of  a non-discrimination approach towards technical barriers to free 
movement provisions some of  the reasons for this failure. Attempting to 
unify almost all technical aspects of  regulation, including extremely de-
tailed technical specification, testing, approvals and certification proved 
extremely difficult to accomplish in general and far more difficult in a 
Council where Member States were insisting on veto power. The principle 
of  mutual recognition was supposed to breathe new life into the internal 
market project. Nowadays harmonisation is following a completely differ-
ent approach, as it has been restricted to laying down health and safety 
of  Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands. The purpose of  the organization is to discuss 
and debate in which areas of  law there should be uniformity among the states and ter-
ritories and to draft acts accordingly. The results of  these discussions are proposed to the 
various jurisdictions as model legislation or uniform acts.
43  Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USC 1738 A.
44  See a detailed explanation of  UCCJEA in Hoff, P., Juvenile Justice Bulletin, US De-
partment of  Justice, December 2001.
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standards (the so-called “New Approach”),45 while European standardiza-
tion is being promoted. Standardization is important because it reduces 
barriers to intra-EU trade and because it increases the competitiveness of  
European industry.46
Mutual recognition applies to products which are not subject to EU 
harmonisation legislation, or to aspects of  products falling outside the 
scope of  such legislation. According to that principle, a Member State 
may not prohibit the sale on its territory of  products which are lawful-
ly marketed in another Member State, even where those products were 
manufactured in accordance with technical rules different from those to 
which domestic products are subject. The only exceptions to that princi-
ple are restrictions which are justified on the grounds set out in Article 36 
TFEU, or on the basis of  other overriding reasons of  public interest and 
which are proportionate to the aim pursued.47 Given its monopoly in in-
terpreting EU law, it is up to ECJ to confirm whether the conditions for 
mutual recognition are met in a specific case. After critically inspecting 
the national measures amounting to restrictions on the basis of  principles 
such as non-discrimination and proportionality, the ECJ usually verifies 
whether the regulatory objectives in the origin and destination countries 
are “equivalent”. If  equivalent, the derogation cannot be invoked. After 
all, the effect in terms of  risks to consumers, workers, etc., is then similar 
so that the trade barrier cannot be justified. The importing Member State 
ought to “recognize” that the regulatory regime of  the exporting Member 
State does not increase risks in an appreciable way. In so doing, the ECJ 
implies that mutual recognition amounts to the combination of  origin 
principle and equivalence.
It is important to note that, by creating a non-exhaustive list of  justifi-
cation grounds written down in the TFEU, the ECJ has stressed from the 
very beginning the non-automatic or conditional nature of  the principle 
of  mutual recognition. This principle gradually gained a primary status 
in the other free movement areas, including the mutual recognition of  di-
plomas, which falls within the scope of  the free movement of  persons. At 
present, mutual recognition in the area of  fundamental freedoms only ex-
45  Chalmers, D. et al., European Union…, cit., p. 696.
46  Craig, P. and Búrca, G. de, EU Law – Text, cases and materials, 4th ed., p. 620 f.
47  Dashwood, A. et al., European Union Law, Oxford, 2011, p. 412.
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ists as a concept defined by the ECJ’s interpretation of  the EU treaty and 
it is not explicitly enshrined in the treaty. 
B. Judicial cooperation in specific areas of  law
Mutual recognition is far from being restricted to intra-EU trade and 
has been extended by way of  analogy to the area of  judicial cooperation 
in civil and criminal matters, while taking into account the specificities of  
these new areas. In the field of  judicial cooperation this principle means 
in simple terms that once a certain measure, such as a decision taken by 
a judge in exercising his or her official powers in one Member State, has 
been taken, that measure —in so far as it has extranational implications— 
would automatically be accepted in all other Member States, and have the 
same or at least similar effects there.
The strategy for its application was established at the European Coun-
cil meeting in Tampere (Finland) on 15 and 16 October 1999. Inspired by 
the concept developed originally in the context of  the single market, the 
essential objective of  this approach consists in establishing closer coopera-
tion between the authorities of  Member States. It seeks to eliminate obsta-
cles deriving from incompatibilities between the various legal and admin-
istrative systems, and thus facilitate access to justice. Judicial cooperation 
in this area is meant to contribute to the creation of  an “area of  justice, 
freedom and security with respect for fundamental rights and the different 
legal systems and traditions of  the Member States”, as governed by Titel 
V of  the TFEU. Its cornerstone in civil matters is the mutual recognition 
and enforcement of  judgements and of  decisions resulting from extrajudi-
cial cases. For this purpose, the general provision in Article 67 Paragraph 
4 TFEU in conjunction with Article 81 TFEU provides, in a similar way 
as in the US Constitution, for a legal basis allowing the legislator to adopt 
legal acts implementing this principle.48 The EU legislator has exercised 
his competence by adopting a series of  legal acts, which will be listed up 
later. Something similar applies to the area of  criminal law, serving Article 
67 Paragraph 3 TFEU in conjunction with Article 82 Paragraph 1 TFEU 
as the legal basis for legislative action. 
48  Hess, B., “The Brussels I Regulation: Recent case law of  the Court of  Justice and 
the Commission’s proposed recast”, Common Market Law Review, núm. 49, 2012, p. 1076.
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C. Judicial cooperation in civil matters
The Tampere European Council laid the foundations for the Euro-
pean Area of  Justice by setting several objectives for the European institu-
tions, including easier access to justice and strengthening mutual recog-
nition of  court decisions. Five years later, recognising that institutional 
constraints and a lack of  political consensus had prevented the full imple-
mentation of  the Tampere Programme, the Hague European Council of  
4 and 5 November 2004 launched a new action plan for 2005-2010. In 
matters of  civil justice, the Hague Programme underlined the need to con-
tinue the implementation of  mutual recognition and to extend it to new ar-
eas such as family property, successions and wills. The Hague Programme 
has been followed by the Stockholm Programme, which represents the 
roadmap for future developments in the area of  freedom, security and 
justice over the five-year period from 2010 to 2014. The Treaty of  Lisbon 
makes all measures in the field of  judicial cooperation in civil matters 
subject to the ordinary legislative procedure. However, family law remains 
subject to a special legislative procedure: the Council acts unanimously af-
ter consulting Parliament. The Council may decide that certain aspects of  
family law with cross-border implications can be the subject of  regulations 
adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure. In this case 
the proposal is notified to national parliaments. If  a single national parlia-
ment is opposed then this will prevent it from being adopted.
Legal acts implementing the principle of  mutual recognition can be 
classified into four different categories depending on their respective func-
tion: 
a. Determination of  the competent court, recognition
and enforcement of  judgments and of  decisions 
in extrajudicial cases
The main instrument in this area is Council Regulation (EC) No 
44/2001 of  22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of  judgments in civil and commercial matters (“Brussels I 
Regulation”). This regulation seeks to harmonise the rules of  conflict of  
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jurisdiction within the Member States49 and to simplify and expedite the 
recognition and enforcement of  decisions in civil and commercial matters. 
Some commentators actually consider this Regulation to be the functional 
equivalent to the Full Faith and Credit Clause in US civil procedural law.50 
Under this Regulation, a judgment given in an EU Member State is to 
be recognised in the other Member States without any special procedure 
being required. “Judgment” means any judgment given by a court or tri-
bunal of  an EU country, whatever the judgment may be called, including 
a decree, order, decision or writ of  execution. Under no circumstances 
may a foreign judgment be reviewed as to its substance. As a matter of  
exception, a judgment will not be recognised if  such recognition is mani-
festly contrary to public policy in the EU country in which recognition is 
sought; the defendant was not served with the document that instituted 
the proceedings in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable the de-
fendant to arrange for his/her defence; it is irreconcilable with a judgment 
given in a dispute between the same parties in the EU country in which 
recognition is sought; it is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in 
another EU or non-EU Member State involving the same cause of  action 
and the same parties. 
The Brussels I Regulation is supplemented by Council Regulation (EC) 
No 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforce-
ment of  judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of  parental re-
sponsibility (“Brussels IIa Regulation”).51 In order to facilitate internation-
49  In its judgment of  15 March 2012 in the case C-292/10, G, not yet reported, par. 
39, the ECJ recalled that “the application of  the uniform rules of  jurisdiction established 
by Regulation núm. 44/2001 …meets the essential requirement of  legal certainty and 
the objective, pursued by that regulation, of  strengthening the legal protection of  persons 
established in the European Union, by enabling the applicant to identify easily the court in 
which he may sue and the defendant reasonably to foresee before which court he may be 
sued”.
50  Rösler, H., Europäische Gerichtsbarkeit …, cit., p. 485.
51  ,QLWVMXGJPHQWRI 'HFHPEHULQWKHFDVH&338'HWLĀHN6JXHJ-
lia [2009] ECR I-12193, the ECJ referred to the principle established by Regulation No 
2201/2003 of  mutual recognition of  judgments given in the Member States, a principle 
which is itself  based, as follows from recital 21 in the preamble to that Regulation, “on 
the principle of  mutual trust between Member States”. In its judgment of  22 December 
2010 in the case C-491/10 PPU, Aguirre Zarrage [2010] ECR- I-14247, the ECJ declared 
that the system established by Regulation No 2201/2003 is based on “the allocation of  a 
central role to the court which has jurisdiction to rule on the substance of  the case” (the 
www.juridicas.unam.mx
Esta revista forma parte del acervo de la Biblioteca Jurídica Virtual del Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la UNAM
http://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx
EL PRINCIPIO DE RECONOCIMIENTO MUTUO EN EL DERECHO
D. R. © 2014. UNAM, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, 
Boletín Mexicano de Derecho Comparado, núm. 140, pp. 449-484.
473
al recovery of  maintenance obligations by making this speedier and less 
costly, if  not free of  charge under certain conditions, in December 2008 
the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No 4/2009. This regulation brings to-
gether in a single instrument uniform rules on jurisdiction, applicable law, 
recognition and enforcement, as well as on cooperation between national 
authorities. With a view to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of  
cross-border insolvency proceedings, the Council adopted Regulation (EC) 
No 1346/2000 of  29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings, which sets out 
uniform rules on jurisdiction, recognition and applicable law in this area. 
In order to abolish exequatur for decisions relating to uncontested claims, 
Parliament and the Council adopted under the co-decision procedure 
Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for 
uncontested claims.
In October 2009, the Commission presented a proposal for a Regula-
tion on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of  deci-
sions and authentic instruments in matters of  succession and the creation 
of  a European Certificate of  Succession. The aim of  this proposal was 
to eliminate all the obstacles encountered by citizens in the enforcement 
of  their rights in the context of  international successions, arising out of  
the diversity of  national rules in this area. The European Parliament’s 
Legal Affairs Committee and the European Parliament plenary voted on 
a report on the draft legislation in March 2012. The EU’s Member State 
governments, represented in the Council of  the EU, adopted the new law 
on 7 June 2012. Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 gives Member States three 
years to align their national laws so that the new EU rules become effec-
tive. Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom however did not take 
part in the adoption of  the instrument and are not bound by it.
The adoption of  European legislation on matrimonial property re-
gimes was among the priorities identified in the 1998 Vienna Action Plan. 
The Hague Programme called on the Commission to submit a Green Pa-
per on ‘the conflict of  laws in matters concerning matrimonial property 
regimes, including the question of  jurisdiction and mutual recognition’, 
national court issuing the judicial decision). In accordance with recital 21 in the preamble 
to the Regulation, the recognition and enforcement of  judgments given in a Member State 
should be based on the principle of  mutual trust. The ECJ deduced from this principle that 
“grounds for non-recognition of  judicial decisions (by the court required to execute the 
judicial decision) should be kept to the minimum required”.
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and stressed the need to adopt legislation in this area. The Stockholm 
Programme also states that mutual recognition must be extended to matri-
monial property regimes and the property consequences of  the separation 
of  unmarried couples. Because of  the distinctive features of  marriage and 
registered partnerships, and of  the different legal consequences resulting 
from these forms of  union, the Commission presented two separate Regu-
lations: one on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and en-
forcement of  decisions in matters of  matrimonial property regimes, and 
the other on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforce-
ment of  decisions in matters of  the property consequences of  registered 
partnerships (same-sex unions). The proposal for a Council Regulation 
on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of  decisions 
relating to matrimonial property regimes52 (of  March 2011) seeks to es-
tablish a clear legal framework in the European Union for determining 
jurisdiction and the law applicable to matrimonial property regimes and 
to facilitate the movement of  decisions and instruments among the Mem-
ber States. Similar to the proposal referred to in the previous paragraph, 
the proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law 
and the recognition and enforcement of  decisions regarding the property 
consequences of  registered partnerships53 (also from March 2011) seeks 
to establish a clear legal framework in the European Union for registered 
partnerships.
Better access to justice is one of  the key objectives of  the EU’s policy. 
The concept of  access to justice includes promoting the use of  appropriate 
dispute resolution procedures for individuals and business, and not just ac-
cess to the judicial system. To that end, on 21 May 2008 the Commission, 
the European Parliament and the Council adopted Directive 2008/52/EC 
on certain aspects of  mediation in civil and commercial matters, the pur-
pose of  which is to facilitate access to alternative dispute resolution and to 
promote the amicable settlement of  disputes by encouraging the further 
use of  mediation and by ensuring a balanced relationship between media-
52  Commission proposal of  16 March 2011 for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, 
applicable law, recognition and enforcement of  decisions relating to matrimonial property 
regimes, COM(2011) 126 final.
53  Commission proposal of  16 March 2011 for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, 
applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of  decisions regarding the property 
consequences of  registered partnerships, COM(2011) 127 final.
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tion and judicial proceedings. Denmark is not taking part in the adoption 
of  this Directive is not bound by it or subject to its application.
b. Harmonisation of  conflict-of-law rules
After lengthy preparatory work, the European Parliament and the 
Council adopted Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations (Rome I). In this area, the harmonisation of  con-
flict-of-law rules, by improving the predictability of  the outcome of  litiga-
tion, also helps to prevent distortions of  competition and protects weaker 
parties. The laborious adoption process (three readings and more than 
four years of  negotiations between the Council and the European Parlia-
ment) for Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of  11 July 2007 on the law appli-
cable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) has enabled the creation 
of  a uniform set of  conflict-of-law rules for non-contractual obligations 
in civil and commercial matters. It thus seeks to improve legal certainty 
and the predictability of  the outcome of  litigation. Conflict-of-law rules 
relating to maintenance obligations are set out in Council Regulation (EC) 
No 4/2009 of  18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recogni-
tion and enforcement of  decisions and cooperation in matters relating to 
maintenance obligations. In the area of  the law applicable to divorce and 
legal separation, in December 2010 the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 
No 1259/2010, which represents the implementation of  the first enhanced 
cooperation in the history of  the EU. It establishes a clear and compre-
hensive legal framework for divorce and legal separation in the 14 par-
ticipating Member States. As mentioned above, the European Parliament 
and the EU Council have recently approved a proposal for a regulation to 
determine, inter alia, the law applicable to international successions.
c. Facilitating access to justice
In order to improve access to justice in cross-border disputes, the 
Council adopted Directive 2003/8/EC establishing minimum common 
rules relating to legal aid for such disputes. The purpose of  the directive 
is to guarantee an ‘adequate’ level of  legal aid in cross-border disputes 
for persons who lack sufficient resources. In order to make access to jus-
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tice easier and more effective for European citizens and businesses, the 
European Union has introduced common procedural rules for simplified 
and accelerated cross-border litigation on small claims and the cross-bor-
der recovery of  uncontested pecuniary claims throughout the European 
Union. These are found in Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 establishing a 
European Small Claims Procedure, and Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 
creating a European order for payment procedure. These procedures are 
optional and additional to the procedures provided for by national law. 
Directive 2008/52/EC establishes common rules on certain aspects of  me-
diation in civil and commercial matters in order to increase legal certainty 
and thereby encourage use of  this method of  dispute resolution.
d. Instruments for cross-border cooperation between national
civil courts 
Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of  the European Parliament and of  the 
Council of  13 November 2007 on the service in the Member States of  
judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters is in-
tended to simplify and expedite the transmission between Member States 
of  judicial and extrajudicial documents for service purposes and thus to 
increase the efficiency and speed of  judicial procedures. In order to sim-
plify and accelerate cooperation between courts in the various Member 
States in the taking of  evidence in civil or commercial matters, the Coun-
cil adopted Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001.
To improve, simplify and expedite judicial cooperation between the 
Member States and to promote access to justice for citizens engaging in 
cross-border disputes, a European Judicial Network in civil and commer-
cial matters was established by Council Decision 2001/470/EC of  28 May 
2001. The network is composed of  contact points designated by the Mem-
ber States, the central authorities provided for in some EU instruments, 
liaison magistrates, and any other authority with responsibilities for judi-
cial cooperation between state actors (courts, central authorities). Decision 
2001/470/EC was amended by Decision 568/2009/EC of  the European 
Parliament and of  the Council of  18 June 2009 aimed at enhancing and 
reinforcing the role of  the European Judicial Network in civil and com-
mercial matters. A major innovation introduced by the new decision con-
sists of  opening the network to professional associations representing legal 
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practitioners, in particular lawyers, solicitors, barristers, notaries and bail-
iffs. Another tool for simplifying judicial cooperation in civil matters con-
sists of  the development, at European level, of  the use of  information and 
communication technologies in the administration of  justice. This project 
was launched in June 2007 by the Justice and Home Affairs Council and 
led to the Commission Communication on a European e-Justice Strategy 
of  30 May 2008. The e-Justice tools cover: the European e-Justice por-
tal, which aims to facilitate access by citizens and enterprises to justice in 
Europe; the interconnection of  criminal records at European level; bet-
ter use of  videoconferencing during judicial proceedings and innovative 
translation tools such as automated translation, dynamic online forms and 
a European database of  legal translators and interpreters.
D. Judicial cooperation in criminal matters
a. Introduction
Since the coming into force of  the Lisbon Treaty, the principle of  
mutual recognition in criminal matters has gained an explicit legal ba-
sis, namely Article 82 Paragraph 1 TFEU. Under Article 82 Paragraph 1 
TFEU “[j]udicial cooperation in criminal matters in the Union shall be 
based on the principle of  mutual recognition of  judgments and judicial 
decisions and shall include the approximation of  the laws and regulations 
of  the Member States”. However, as in many other cases, it was not the 
EU who made the first step but rather followed the example of  other re-
gional arrangements. 
The first initiatives intending to create mutual trust and to encourage 
mutual recognition of  decisions in the area of  criminal law took place 
within the framework of  the Council of  Europe, an international organi-
zation of  47 Member States whose primary goal consists in promoting 
co-operation between all countries of  Europe in the areas of  legal stand-
ards, human rights, democratic development, the rule of  law and cultural 
co-operation.54 Examples of  these are: the European Convention on the 
Supervision of  Conditionally Sentenced or Conditionally Released Of-
fenders and the European Convention on the Punishment of  Road Traf-
54  Hecker, B., Europäisches Strafrecht, Heidelberg, 2005, p. 79.
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fic Offences, both of  them of  30 November 1964; the European Con-
vention on the International Validity of  Criminal Judgments, agreed at 
The Hague in May 1970; the European Convention on the Transfer of  
Proceedings in Criminal Matters of  15 May 1972; the Convention on the 
Transfer of  Sentenced Persons of  21 March 1983. There is also a Con-
vention between the Member States of  the European Communities on the 
Enforcement of  Foreign Criminal Sentences of  13 November 1991. All 
the Conventions mentioned above have a regional or subregional scope. 
They are characterized by the following common aspects: the general rule 
that enforcement is governed by the law of  the requested State; the provi-
sion of  a number of  grounds of  refusal; in some of  them, the possibility 
for the State of  enforcement to arrest the offender upon request of  anoth-
er State and to seize his assets (subject to conditions and limits); the possi-
bility given to the State of  enforcement of  converting the penalty provided 
for by its national law for the same or comparable offences, provided that 
the penal situation of  the sentenced person is not aggravated.
The issue of  mutual recognition was at one point moved within the 
framework of  the EU, the reason being that, firstly, the aforementioned 
Conventions were characterized by what could be called a noncommittal 
“request principle”, and, secondly, they had seldom entered into force in 
all Member States due to a lack of  ratification by national parliaments. 
The Amsterdam Treaty had reinforced the powers of  the EU in criminal 
matters to a considerable extent, but the European Council as the EU’s 
supreme political body was aware that more initiatives were needed to 
make the new Treaty provisions useful tools for a truly effective judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters within the EU. Borrowing from concepts 
that had worked very well in the creation of  the Single Market and mix-
ing them with elements from some Council of  Europe Conventions, a 
new strategy at EU level was born: the principle of  mutual recognition in 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. 
The application of  this principle has been the motor of  European 
integration in criminal matters in the recent past. The adoption of  Coun-
cil Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of  13 June 2002 on the European arrest 
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States constituted undoubt-
edly a milestone in the development of  EU criminal law, and was followed 
by a series of  measures aiming at paving the way for mutual recognition 
between Member States, including the approximation of  related national 
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laws and the application of  common minimum rules. The minimum rules 
mainly relate to the admissibility of  evidence and the rights of  crime vic-
tims as well as of  individuals in criminal procedures. At least two crucial 
features of  the EU’s view on mutual recognition are perceptible from this. 
Firstly, mutual recognition does not operate in a legal vacuum but should 
be supplemented —where necessary— by approximation measures. This 
shows the complementary nature of  both approaches. Secondly, mutual 
recognition strives for a dual purpose: it is not only aimed at enhancing 
judicial cooperation, but also pursues the judicial protection of  funda-
mental rights.
b. Legal acts adopted
All the legislative measures adopted so far have taken the form a 
Framework Decision, a legal instrument typical for the formerly intergov-
ernmental area of  cooperation in judicial matters, now abolished after the 
entering into force of  the Lisbon Treaty and having basically the same 
harmonizing effect as an EU Directive. The first instrument of  mutual 
recognition to be created was the European Arrest Warrant, which is ap-
plicable both to final judgments and the pre-trial phase. It replaces the 
extradition system by requiring each national judicial authority (the ex-
ecuting judicial authority) to recognise, ipso facto, and with a minimum of  
formalities, requests for the surrender of  a person made by the judicial 
authority of  another Member State (the issuing judicial authority).55
The framework decision defines “European arrest warrant” as any 
judicial decision issued by a Member State with a view to the arrest or sur-
render by another Member State of  a requested person, for the purposes 
of  conducting a criminal prosecution, executing a custodial sentence or 
executing a detention order. The warrant applies where a final sentence 
of  imprisonment or a detention order has been imposed for a period of  at 
least four months or for offences punishable by imprisonment or a deten-
tion order for a maximum period of  at least one year. If  they are punish-
able in the issuing Member State by a custodial sentence of  at least three 
55  See judgments of  the ECJ of  5 September 2012, case C-42/11, Lopes Da Silva, 
not yet reported, par. 28 and 29; of  16 November 2010, case C-261/09, Mantello, [2010] 
ECR I-11477, par. 35-37. 
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years, the following offences, among others, may give rise to surrender 
without verification of  the double criminality of  the act: terrorism, traf-
ficking in human beings, corruption, participation in a criminal organisa-
tion, counterfeiting currency, murder, racism and xenophobia, rape, traf-
ficking in stolen vehicles, and fraud, including that affecting the financial 
interests of  the EU. For criminal acts other than those mentioned above, 
surrender may be subject to the condition that the act for which surrender 
is requested constitutes an offence under the law of  the executing Mem-
ber State (double criminality rule). The European arrest warrant must 
contain information on the identity of  the person concerned, the issuing 
judicial authority, the final judgment, the nature of  the offence, the pen-
alty, etc. The fulfilment of  this requirement is simplified by the fact that 
a specimen form is attached to the framework decision The framework 
decision entered into force on 1o. January 2004 and replaced the existing 
texts in this area related to extradition procedure between the Member 
States. However, Member States remain at liberty to apply and conclude 
bilateral or multilateral agreements insofar as such agreements help to 
simplify or facilitate the surrender procedures further. 
The introduction of  the European Arrest Warrant meant a crucial 
step towards the establishment of  an area of  justice, freedom and security, 
as it has transformed the extradition procedure into a genuinely judicial 
procedure exempt of  political opportunity considerations.56 Entrusting 
the extradition procedure to the judiciary with its constitutionally guar-
anteed independence undeniably contributed to enhancing mutual trust 
between the Member States.57 This implies a high degree or responsibil-
56  See the legal opinions of  Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer of  12 September 
2006 in the case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld, [2007] ECR I-3633, par. 45, in 
which he declared in view of  the procedure of  rendition introduced by the European 
Arrest Warrant that “… in that situation, any assessment of  opportuneness is irrelevant and the 
power of  review is limited strictly to the courts. In other words, the political authorities 
must allow the judicial authorities to take the lead and an individual assessment of  each 
case must give way to a more general type of  assessment because the Framework Decision 
assumes that national courts have the jurisdiction to prosecute the offences it lists.” 
57  Before the European Arrest Warrant became fully functional important constitu-
tional amendments had to be made in some Member States (Portugal, France, Slovenia 
and Poland). In other Member States (Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic and Cyprus) 
difficulties arose at a later stage, as under the Framework Decision there was no excep-
tion clause allowing a State to refuse to surrender its own nationals. This happened to 
be in contradiction with Article 16 Paragraph 2 of  the German Basic Law, Article 55 of  
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ity, as the principle of  mutual recognition makes of  every national judge 
or prosecutor a European actor, a status which requires greater familiar-
ity with the reality of  European integration and the sharing of  a common 
European legal culture. Therefore, judicial authorities should be encour-
aged to gain insight into the EU legal order as a whole and to familiarise 
themselves with the legal and judicial systems of  the other Member States. 
To the same extend as the ECJ and national courts cooperate and engage 
in a judicial dialogue in the framework of  preliminary judgment proce-
dures, aiming at ensuring the uniform and correct application of  EU law, 
national judicial authorities are required to apply the instruments of  mu-
tual recognition in a spirit of  cooperation and solidarity.
Other instruments within the Mutual Recognition Programme in-
augurated with the Tampere Program and further developed with the 
Hague Program, at the European Council of  4-5 November 2004, can 
be grouped according to the phase of  criminal proceedings to which they 
apply.58 The execution of  orders freezing property of  evidence,59 confis-
cation orders,60 non-custodial pre-trial supervision measures and the Eu-
ropean Evidence Warrant61 all belong to the pre-trial phase. The Frame-
the Polish Constitution, Article 14 Paragraph 4 of  the Czech Constitution and Article 
11 of  the Cypriot Constitution which at the time the Framework Decision was adopted 
still banned the extradition of  own nationals. The amendments were necessary after the 
rulings of  the constitutional courts of  the aforementioned States which partially annulled 
the implementing national laws. Nowadays these provisions foresee the surrender of  own 
nationals within the EU, confirming the mutual trust between the Member States. Polli-
cino, O., “European Arrest Warrant and Constitutional Principles of  the Member States: 
a Case Law-Based Outline in the Attempt to Strike the Right Balance between Interacting 
Legal Systems”, German Law Journal, núm. 10, vol. 9, 2008, p. 1313.
58  See Blackstock, J., “The European Arrest Warrant. Briefing and suggested amend-
ments”, New Journal of  European Criminal Law, vol. 1, 2010, p. 17; Vernimmen-Van Tigge-
len, G. and Surano, L., “Introduction”, in Vernimmen-Van Tiggelen, Gisèle et al., The 
future of  mutual recognition in criminal matters in the European Union Brussels, 2009, p. 12.
59  Council Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA of  22 July 2003 on the execution in 
the European Union of  orders freezing property or evidence (OJEU L 196).
60  Council Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA of  6 October 2006 on the application 
of  the principle of  mutual recognition to confiscation orders (OJEU L 328).
61  Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of  18 December 2008 on the Euro-
pean evidence warrant for the purpose of  obtaining objects, documents and data for use 
in proceedings in criminal matters (OJEU L 350).
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work Directives on financial penalties,62 confiscation orders, on judgments 
in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving 
deprivation of  liberty for the purpose of  their enforcement in the EU63 
and on judgments and probation decisions with a view to the supervision 
of  probation measures and alternative sanctions64 refer to the post-trial 
phase. It is possible to note some common aspects in all these measures: 
the provision of  a certificate to be completed by the issuing Member State 
as well as of  a standard form, the speeding up of  the procedures for rec-
ognition and execution of  decisions, as well as a limited list of  mandatory 
and optional ground for refusal.
The EU has adopted a number of  legal acts aiming at harmonising 
substantive criminal law in an attempt to make mutual recognition of  
judicial decisions possible. Article 83 TFEU provides for a new compe-
tence of  the EU “to establish minimum rules concerning the definition of  
criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of  particularly serious crime 
with cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of  such 
offences or from a special need to combat them on a common basis.” 
These areas of  crime are the following: terrorism, trafficking in human 
beings and sexual exploitation of  women and children, illicit drug traffick-
ing, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting 
of  means of  payment, computer crime and organised crime. Before the 
Treaty of  Lisbon entered into force the legitimacy of  some of  those legal 
acts had been questioned by scholars who claimed that the legal acts had 
been adopted under the former legal basis which did not expressly provide 
for a competence to penalize the criminal acts in question. By reframing 
the former provision the EU has finally created an adequate legal basis.
62  Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of  24 February 2005 on the applica-
tion of  the principle of  mutual recognition to financial penalties (OJEU L 76).
63  Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of  27 November 2008 on the appli-
cation of  the principle of  mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing 
custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of  liberty for the purpose of  their 
enforcement in the European Union (OJEU L 327).
64  Council Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA of  27 November 2008 on the applica-
tion of  the principle of  mutual recognition to judgments and probation decisions with a 
view to the supervision of  probation measures and alternative sanctions (OJEU L 337).
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c. The ne bis in idem principle
Last but not least, at final comment should be made on the efforts of  
the EU to implement the ne bis in idem principle in the area of  justice, free-
dom and security. According to Article 54 of  Agreement Implementing 
the Schengen Convention (CISA),65 “A person whose trial has been finally 
disposed of  in one Contracting Party may not be prosecuted in another 
Contracting Party for the same acts provided that, if  a penalty has been 
imposed, it has been enforced, is actually in the process of  being enforced 
or can no longer be enforced under the laws of  the sentencing Contract-
ing Party.” Moreover, in situations where Article 54 CISA is not applica-
ble, the “taking into consideration” or “accounting” principle, laid down 
in Article 56 CISA, comes into play. In accordance with this provision any 
imposition of  a second sentence must deduce relevant time already served 
in the initial sentencing State and take account of  any non-custodial sen-
tence to the extend provided for by national law. Even though the latter 
principle is to be distinguished from the former, they are complementary 
and both highly relevant in the light of  the mutual recognition principle. 
The ne bis in idem principle constitutes the acknowledgment of  a unified 
space of  criminal justice, in which similar values are shared. The ECJ has 
interpreted the principle of  mutual recognition as the corollary of  the ne 
bis in idem principle.66 It is important to stress that in its case-law, begin-
ning with the judgment Gözütok & Brügge,67 the ECJ repeatedly held that 
the the ne bis in idem principle necessarily implies that Member States have 
“mutual trust” in their criminal justice systems. This shows that all these 
principles are, as already stated, intrinsically interconnected.
65  The Schengen acquis - Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of  14 
June 1985 between the Governments of  the States of  the Benelux Economic Union, the 
Federal Republic of  Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of  checks 
at their common borders (OJEU L 239)
66  See judgments of  the ECJ of  11 February 2011, joined cases C-187/01 and 
C-385/01, Gözütok and Brügge, 2003, ECR-1345; of  28 September 2006, case C-150/05, 
van Straaten, 2006, ECR I-9327; of  11 December 2008, case C-297/07, Bouquain, 2008, 
ECR-9425; of  22 December 2008, case C-491/07, Turansky, 2008, ECR I-11039.
67  Judgments of  the ECJ of  11 February 2011, joined cases C-187/01 and C-385/01, 
Gözütok and Brügge, 2003, ECR-1345, pfo. 33.
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V. FINAL REMARKS
For more than a decade the EU has successfully emulated a concept 
well anchored in US constitutional law: The mutual recognition of  ju-
dicial decisions between States. Not only have the adequate legal basis 
been incorporated in EU Treaty law, but also significant steps have been 
made towards the creation of  an authentic area of  justice, freedom and 
security. It should be noted however that this approach has by no means 
been implement to the detriment of  harmonisation. On the contrary, the 
EU has remained committed to achieving harmonisation in the area of  
civil and criminal law —both procedural and substantive— up to a degree 
acceptable to all Member States, following the political objectives set by 
the European Council. This has taken place in due acknowledgment of  the 
complementarity of  both concepts.
Following the model of  the US by encouraging mutual recognition within 
an institutional structure showing federal features might eventually raise the 
inevitable question regarding the future of  the EU, as it needs to be borne in 
mind that from the perspective of  the US Supreme Court the mechanism of  
mutual recognition constitutes an instrument aimed at strengthening the ties 
between the several States within the Federation and, in so doing, unifying 
the American nation. It is doubtful that exactly the same philosophy could 
ever be transposed to Europe with its diversity of  nations, each of  them hav-
ing unique traditions and looking back at centuries or even millennia of  his-
tory. The academic debate as to whether a common European nation could 
emerge one day being mostly answered in the negative, policymakers and 
scholars involved in the process of  designing the future of  Europe are more 
than ever called upon to debate on the final purpose of  integration.
On the other hand, it cannot be ruled out that, as on many occasions 
in recent history, situations like the current debt crisis putting at risk the 
stability of  the common currency (the Euro) might eventually push Euro-
peans towards deeper integration in an attempt to face those crises col-
lectively, eventually giving rise to an authentic political union. Should the 
European nations truly strive for such a political union, which remains to 
be seen, one might wonder whether the principle of  mutual recognition 
should not start being conceived by the ECJ in the same way as the US 
Supreme Court does, namely as a nation-building element in EU consti-
tutional law.
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